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Like a student blocking his access to the internet to help him study,
governments across the globe rely on commitment devices to generate
fiscal discipline. From the collapse of the Congressional Supercommittee
in the United States to the near-cataclysmic failure of a mechanism
designed to prevent the European Union debt crisis, the evidence suggests
that faith in such commitment devices is misplaced. This Article focuses on
one such device that stubbornly refuses to stay dead: the tax expenditure
budget. Created to guard against abuse by publicizing the costs of tax
subsidies then resurrected as a bean counter, the tax expenditure budget is
a zombie accountant. Dreadfully unsuited to its new life, the tax
expenditure budget produces information that is both flawed and limited.
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INTRODUCTION
Long dead as a constraint on policymaker behavior,' a guardian
known as the tax expenditure budget has been reanimated to serve a
different role: accountant. Unfortunately, as poor a goad as the tax
expenditure budget proved, it makes an even worse guide. Now a
zombie accountant shambling through the corridors of power, the tax
expenditure budget has become an object of derision where it was
once hailed as a champion.
Enacted into law decades ago, the tax expenditure budget computes
the dollar cost of a wide range of tax breaks. It serves as a shadow
budget for tax benefits that would otherwise fall through cracks in the
budget process.' Unfortunately, treating tax expenditures as mere
accounting glitches - rather than a complex political phenomenon
capitalizing on psychological failures and legislative asymmetries -
ensures that the tax expenditure budget can neither contain nor
describe tax expenditure abuse.
The tax expenditure budget - like the Congressional
Supercommittee and the E.U. Stability and Growth Pact - is a
commitment device.' Although he did not use these labels, Stanley
See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX.
L. REV. 187, 187 (2004) [hereinafter Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures]
(concluding that after several decades the tax expenditure budget had "made little if
any headway" towards the goal of preventing policymakers from using tax
expenditures).
2 The tax expenditure budget is increasingly viewed as a critical source of fiscal
policy insight. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 3
(2010) [hereinafter Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress] ("Tax expenditure
analysis should serve as an important pragmatic tool for policymakers to use in sorting
out their priorities, and in understanding in a straightforward way both the economic
consequences of their decisions and the policy alternatives that might be relevant to
the implementation of their ideas.") (emphasis added).
Zombies come in many forms. See Adam Chodorow, Death and Taxes and
Zombies, 98 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.corn/abstract=
2045255 (describing wide variety of zombie types). The tax expenditure budget might
best be described as one that "slowly stumble[s] along" but "retainis] some of the
memories or personalities of the original person." Id.
It guides by serving as an "informational aid." Julie Roin, Truth in Government:
Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 603, 608 (2003). The notion is
that since tax expenditures have many of the "same economic and social effects as
direct government expenditures," it is useful for them to "be analyzed accordingly for
economic and political purposes." Id.
I See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure
Analysis and its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 561 (2008) [hereinafter
Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating] ("[T~he principal purpose and justification of TEA
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Surrey persuaded Congress to codify the tax expenditure budget as a
"disabling rule" intended to "preclude[] the possibility of" tax
expenditure abuse.' Like a student installing software on his laptop to
"disable" his internet access to help him study,' Surrey gambled that
ending the privileged "off-budget" status of tax expenditures would
allow policymakers to cure themselves of their collective weakness for
abusing tax expenditures.' Unfortunately, just as our student might
easily defeat the most cleverly designed software by accessing the
internet on his phone, time has revealed the tax expenditure budget to
be a poor source of "discipline, enforcement, land] resistance to
temptation."'
is to serve as a triggering mechanism for mandatory recasting and cost/benefit analysis
of governmental programs accomplished through the federal income tax system.");
Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legislation, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 353,
356-57 (2010) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Framework]. Surrey's goal - the purpose of the
commitment device - was to force legislators to "convert[]" tax expenditures "into
direct expenditures or repeal [them] altogether." Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures,
supra note 1, at 187.
6 See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J. L ECON. & ORG. 357,
370 (1985) [hereinafter Schelling, Enforcing Rules] (defining disabling rules). For
much of its existence, the tax expenditure budget has been characterized as a "strictly
informational" exercise intended to "give Congress reliable estimates of the costs in
foregone revenue of tax provisions that are functionally equivalent to spending
programs." Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax
Expenditure, 14 UC DAVIS L. REv. 79, 88 (1980). That may be the role it has come to
play, but was not what Surrey intended. See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures,
supra note 1, at 187 (explaining that Surrey's "aim" was do away with tax
expenditures). Looking for meaning in the tax expenditure budget makes as little
sense as seeking meaning in any other commitment device.
Freedom is a popular program that blocks internet use for a specified amount of
time. Once turned on, users must restart their computer to turn it off. See FREEDOM,
http://macfreedom.com/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
8 Surrey argued that "less critical analysis is paid to these tax expenditures than
to almost any direct expenditure program one can mention." STANLEY S. SURREY,
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6 (1973) thereinafter
SURREY, PATHWAYS]. Because tax expenditures allowed policymakers to provide
benefits without scrutiny, they became addicted to tax expenditures. For Surrey,
creating a tax expenditure budget served the same role as modifying a drug addict's
physiology to prevent him from metabolizing his drug of choice. Case, a hacker in
William Gibson's influential cyberpunk novel, finds himself unwillingly cured of an
addiction by just such a technique. See, e.g., WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 45 (1984)
("'You needed a new pancreas. The one we bought for you frees you from a dangerous
dependency.' 'Thanks, but I was enjoying that dependency."') As Case learned, such
cures often turn out to be mixed blessings. Id. at 45-46 (learning of the cure, he is
immediately told that, along with the new pancreas, he acquired "fifteen toxin sacs
bonded to the lining of various main arteries" that his new employer implanted to
ensure his loyalty).
9 See Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 363.
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Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn highlights the
inadequacy of the tax expenditure budget both in its original and
undead incarnations."o When the Supreme Court gave its
constitutional blessing to a tax credit designed to subsidize private
religious education - while conceding that a fiscally identical
spending measure would have received closer scrutiny - it revealed
the breadth of the challenge posed by tax expenditures." Abuses can
be driven by the flaws in the budget process that Surrey identified, but
tax expenditures can just as easily provide policymakers with the
means to flout constitutional safeguards, here the barrier between
church and state. The tax expenditure budget was not designed to
prevent - and therefore cannot measure - the constitutional harms
that flow from the Court's distinction. 12
Dissecting the stubbornly ambulatory tax expenditure budget
reveals the source of both failures. A commitment device succeeds
when it asks a question that can be readily answered." Accordingly,
the tax expenditure budget asks a question that calls for a simple
quantitative response: how expensive are tax expenditures?
Unfortunately, although the tax expenditure budget asks a question
that is easy to answer, those answers are inevitably halftruths,
obscuring as much as they conceal." Rather than attempting to perfect
a definition of tax expenditures, this Article offers a new vocabulary to
facilitate constructive conversations on the nature of - and remedies
for - tax expenditure abuse.
Although not strong enough to prevent tax expenditure abuse, the
tax expenditure budget was created with strength in mind. As a result,
it lacks the sensitivity to detect and distinguish among different
sources of tax expenditure abuse. This Article describes a framework
that uses the tax expenditure budget as its cornerstone, yet is capable
"o 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447-49 (2011) (permitting Arizona to subsidize private
religious schools with tax credits).
" See id. at 1447 ("The distinction between governmental expenditures and tax
credits refutes respondents' assertion of standing."). Winn is only the latest in a long
line of cases applying a more lenient standard for tax expenditures than for direct
expenditures. See id. at 1442-45.
12 See generally Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 407 (1999) (exploring constitutional implications of tax expenditure
analysis).
" See generally Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6 (describing the
characteristics of successful commitment devices, including the presence of bright-line
rules).
14 See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget,
22 NAT'L TAxJ. 244, 259 (1969).
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of assessing the varied threats presented by tax expenditures. That
fiscal advantage framework offers a set of terms that make it possible
to better understand the many forms of tax expenditure abuse and the
impulses that motivate them."
Part I of the Article introduces the tax expenditure budget along
with two other ill-fated fiscal commitment devices: the E.U. effort to
prevent deficits and the recent U.S. attempt to remedy its own. By
highlighting the characteristics that set successful commitment devices
apart, it identifies an unorthodox explanation for the tax expenditure
budget's inability to prevent tax expenditure abuse. As described in
detail in Part II, the Article shows that the tax expenditure budget's
weakness derives not from its failure to precisely define tax
expenditures but from its success in defining tax expenditure abuse as
an accounting failure.
Viewing tax expenditure abuse as the product of accounting failure
means blindness to the full spectrum of incentives that drive
policymakers to abuse tax expenditures. Part III explains how
understanding the limits of the tax expenditure budget - our zombie
" As explained in detail in Parts II and III, that framework uses the concept of
fiscal advantage as its lynchpin. That advantage, like the mechanical advantage
provided by a pulley or lever, allows policymakers to achieve politically improbable
feats. Fiscal advantage is possible, and perhaps inevitable, whenever tax expenditures
receive more forgiving treatment than direct expenditures. See Edward D. Kleinbard,
The Hidden Hand of Government Spending, 33 REG. 18, 22 (Fall 2010) [hereinafter
Hidden Hand] (characterizing tax expenditures as having an "irresistible political
attraction"). Often, just as Surrey believed, fiscal advantage is fueled by gaps in the
budget process. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 8, at 3-4 ("When Congressional talk
and public opinion turn to reduction and control of Federal expenditures, these tax
expenditures are never mentioned. Yet it is clear that if these amounts were treated as
line items on the expenditure side of the Budget, they would automatically come
under . . . close scrutiny."). Unfortunately, that budgetary advantage can be just the
tip of the iceberg. See Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 423-24
(2011) (defining budgetary arbitrage, which is the exploitation of budgetary
advantage). The procedural advantage in evidence in Winn exploits an entirely
different set of vulnerabilities that are inherent in the rulemaking process. See Winn,
131 S. Ct. at 1447-49 (2011) (permitting Arizona to subsidize private religious schools
with tax credits); see also Dean, supra, at 425 (defining procedural arbitrage, the
exploitation of procedural advantage). Finally, cognitive advantage capitalizes on
psychological weaknesses that cause individuals to systematically discount the costs of
tax expenditures. See Dean supra, at 424 (defining cognitive arbitrage, the exploitation
of cognitive advantage); Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 220-21
(discussing impact of heuristics and biases on use of tax expenditures). In concert,
these three forms of fiscal advantage can make a mockery of the tax expenditure
budget and its aim of promoting accountability. The extent to which a provision relies
on fiscal advantage reveals where it falls on the spectrum between a prototypical and
marginal vehicle for tax expenditure abuse. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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accountant - leads to counterintuitive conclusions regarding the
threats tax expenditures pose and produces a richer account of tax
expenditure abuse.
I. UNTHINKABLE PUNISHMENTS
During fraught budget negotiations during the summer of 2011,
Congress delegated extraordinary powers to a bipartisan committee.16
That committee, referred to as the Congressional Supercommittee,
failed to reach a compromise despite the promise of universally
painful consequences in the event of its failure. Faced with a looming
budget impasse, Congress threatened itself with unthinkable
punishments in the event of a failure of the Supercommittee process,
only to watch the final deadline pass without the sought-after
agreement to trim the deficit."
Although dramatic, the Supercommittee's collapse serves as only the
most recent example of government actors unsuccessfully attempting
to harness the power of the commitment device. 18 Like the apocryphal
story of the Athenians' failed attempt to forestall a law's repeal by
imposing the death penalty on anyone attempting to repeal it," the
mere threat of harsh consequences could not relieve the underlying
pressures impeding a resolution to the fiscal impasse.2 0
16 See Mark Landler & Carl Hulse, Obama Summons G.O.P. and Democratic Leaders
for Deficit Reduction Talhs, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A12 (describing efforts to
resolve a looming "budget impasse" triggered by the national debt limit).
17 See, e.g., Budget Control Act of 2011 § 302(a), 2 U.S.C. § 901a (2011)
(providing that failure to meet deficit reduction targets will trigger draconian
automatic reductions in "discretionary appropriations and direct spending").
18 See Michael Cooper, Failure Is Absorbed With Disgust and Fear, But Little
Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at A19 ("The idea of the committee was, in part,
to save Congress from itself. . . . It was Congress lashing itself to the mast, like
Odysseus, to resist the siren calls of lobbyists and special interest groups. But in the
end, the ship went nowhere."). Further examples, including the Federal Reserve and
the European Growth and Stability Pact, are discussed below.
19 See Jon Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities
and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1751, 1760 (2003) ("The ancient
Athenians tried several times to entrench decrees by voting that anyone proposing to
change them would suffer the death penalty, but as there was no death penalty
attached to a proposal to remove the death penalty, these efforts were doomed to
fail."),
20 One dispiriting conclusion that could be drawn from the Supercommittee's
failure is that Congress's embrace of fiscal rectitude is deeply insincere. Similar
conclusions have been drawn in areas as far flung as politicians' support for balanced
budget amendments and states' support for human rights treaties. See Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 514-19 (2005) (concluding that states that join human rights and
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A. Commitment Devices
Gamblers, smokers, alcoholics, and politicians have something in
common: a weakness for cures."1 Just as there is no shortage of
gimmicks guaranteed to break a smoker's dependence on cigarettes,
perceived shortcomings in the democratic process have inspired an
array of prophylactic mechanisms. Term limits, for instance, promise
to neutralize the threat of entrenchment and all the ills that
accompany it. Unfortunately, term limits themselves too often
succumb to the desire of incumbents to remain in office.
Despite their flaws, commitment devices appear to be as popular as
ever among individuals. 4 Governments and their observers likewise
continue to put their faith in administrative machinery designed to
guard against future actions.25 While the allure of commitment devices
is straightforward, creating a successful commitment device is not.
This subpart introduces the theoretical backdrop against which these
mechanisms operate by examining a rogues' gallery of three failed
environmental treaties often have no intention of complying with them); Nancy C.
Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1159
(1998) (suggesting that support for a constitutional balanced budget amendment
allows members of Congress to "postur [e] as stern advocates of a balanced budget").
21 Of course, some addicts have no interest in shedding their addictions. Not even
the most potent commitment device could help such an individual. See Thomas C.
Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1984) [hereinafter Schelling, Self-Command] (explaining that
"[a]nyone who is happily addicted to nicotine, benzedrine, valium, chocolate, heroin,
or horse racing" cannot be helped by commitment devices).
22 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 935-36 (2011) (describing costs of
entrenchment).
23 See, e.g., Whitney Cale, Through the Russian Looking Glass: The Development of a
Russian Rule of Law and Democracy, 7 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 93, 113-14 (2010)
(noting parallels between New York City's amendment of its term limits to permit
Mayor Bloomberg to serve a third term and Vladimir Putin's complex relationship
with term limits).
24 The internet has provided individuals with new avenues to bolster their resolve.
See Stephanie Rosenbloom, I Resolve. World, Don't Fail Me Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2011, at ST8 (describing use of social media and specially tailored websites by
individuals hoping to do everything from losing weight to avoiding pornography).
25 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An
Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.]. 1368, 1370 (2011)
(proposing the creation of a commitment device to prevent future bailouts of large
financial institutions, "a bright-line rule that operationalizes the adage - once
popular among regulators but never implemented - that 'any financial institution
that is too big to fail is too big to survive').
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commitment devices: the tax expenditure budget, the E.U. Stability
and Growth Pact, and the Supercommittee.
1. A Hierarchy of Potency
Commitment devices operate in different ways. Logically,
commitment can occur "either by deleting elements in the set of
feasible actions or by affecting the consequences of choosing them." 26
Burning a bridge or a ship provides the paradigmatic illustration of the
first, the restrictive "disabling" device.2 ' The self-incriminating letter
to be released or the distasteful donation to be made upon a violation
of a commitment suggests the variety of ways that incentives to take or
avoid particular actions can be altered."
A commitment device serves a goal, but inevitably does so in a
second-best manner.29 A compulsive gambler might, for example,
move away from Atlantic City when merely embracing a rule to avoid
its casinos would suffice.o The dramatic step of relocating to another
city would be costly, but could pay enormous dividends by taming an
addiction.
A simple "primary rule" prohibiting gambling would do the same at
less cost, but might be impossible for the gambler to enforce on
himself." "[S]upporting rules" - here, leaving Atlantic City -
advance the same ends as primary rules, but lend themselves more
readily to enforcement.32 But for that edge in enforceability, these
supporting rules would not be worth the cost. Keeping your kitchen
26 See, e.g., Elster, supra note 19, at 1754.
27 See id. at 1761 (offering bridge and ship burning as the quintessential disabling
devices); Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 370 (defining a disabling rule).
2 See Schelling, Self-Command, supra note 21, at 7 (describing a drug-
rehabilitation clinic for physicians that uses "self-blackmail" as a form of therapy and
suggesting a contribution of "$100 payable to a political candidate you despise for any
cigarette you smoke except on twenty-four hours' notice" as a means of guarding
against cravings).
2 See Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 365 ("At the top of the pyramid,
above and beyond the rules, are what we might call goals or preferences. The purpose
of rules is to help us reach our goals or satisfy our preferences.").
30 Such a move might have spared the taxpayer - a compulsive gambler living in
Atlantic City - in a case beloved by tax professors millions of dollars in gambling
losses over the course of several years. See Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110, 111-12
(3d. Cir. 1990).
See Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 366 ("These rules expressing the
way we wish ourselves to behave I shall call primary rules. These primary rules are the
behaviors we want to abide by. If there were no problem of self-management, all we
would need is primary rules.").
32 See id. at 368.
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bare serves as a "disabling" rule that prevents midnight snacking."
While much more likely to be effective than a simple vow not to
indulge in a midnight snack, a permanently empty kitchen would also
be extremely inconvenient.
Alternatively, an individual might be concerned about her smoking
but not her drinking. Nevertheless, she might recognize drinking as a
precursor to smoking. A "precautionary" rule against drinking may help
her to break her smoking habit.34 Neither a bare kitchen nor teetotaling
have value in themselves, but both help to achieve a valuable end.
Although a less burdensome rule would be more desirable, success
demands the use of the more expansive supporting rule.
As the above examples suggest, there is a hierarchy of potency
across commitment devices. Although both would be more reliable
than a primary rule (a vow against midnight snacking), a disabling
rule (keep the kitchen empty) is more difficult to violate than a
precautionary rule (no eating after ten o'clock). In other words, "the
precautionary rule merely draws a brighter line a safer distance away
from the activity enjoined by the primary rule" while "the disabling
rule would put the prohibited activity altogether beyond reach.""
Like a precautionary rule, a commitment device that merely imposes
higher costs on an activity is less potent than a disabling rule. 6 Unlike
a disabling device, both require an individual to affirmatively exercise
restraint in the face of temptation. A precautionary device merely aims
to weaken temptation's attraction. Increasing the cost of indulgence
does the same, raising the stakes of failure without diminishing the
appeal or availability of the vice in question. At the risk of
understatement, making it impossible to smoke, drink, or snack
trumps tinkering with the desire to do so.
The tax expenditure budget, which publicizes spending measures
that would otherwise remain hidden, exemplifies the most potent
commitment mechanism: the disabling device. As burning a bridge or
a ship makes retreat impossible, the tax expenditure budget pulled
back a curtain that once allowed policymakers to surreptitiously use
tax provisions as spending substitutes: they could effectively spend
' See id. at 370.
* See id. at 369 (noting that if the smoker is addicted to cigarettes but can resist
them so long as he does not drink, refraining from drinking can be a crucial
precaution against smoking).
" See id. at 370.
36 Storing credit cards in a safe deposit box would make it more difficult to use
them, but closing the accounts entirely would provide surer relief from high credit
card bills.
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vast sums of money without anyone noticing. With secrecy reduced to
cinders, Surrey assumed that policymakers would have little use for
tax expenditures and that tax expenditures would either be
transformed into direct spending or simply go up in smoke."
2. Ambiguity
A second dimension along which commitment devices differ is the
precision with which the targeted behavior can be identified. A
smoker may, for example, distinguish between a "bummed" cigarette
and one she purchases. Of course, the generous spirit in which that
cigarette is given and received makes it no less toxic or addictive than
any other. Because "[rlules are best observed if you can easily tell the
difference between compliance and violation," bright-line rules work
best.38 If failure cannot be distinguished from success, the potential
consequences of falling short mean little,
The European Union's Stability and Growth Pact - along with the
ongoing financial crisis it failed to prevent - highlight the importance
of precision." The Pact promotes the expansion of the European
Union by helping "to stabilize and support the euro currency union.""
It operates by monitoring economic data such as inflation and
exchange rates. It also creates a punitive mechanism triggered
whenever a state's deficit exceeds three percent of its Gross Domestic
Product.4 2
Had the Pact functioned as designed, Greece would have been
compelled to balance its budget in order to become and remain an
E.U. member state. Instead, Greece consumed a steady stream of
bummed cigarettes - here loans disguised as currency transactions -
with a predictably negative impact on its economic health but with no
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38 See Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 366.
3 Id. at 367 (" A] 'bright line' is a discontinuity, or a qualitative difference. I know
whether or not I drank, smoked, ate dessert, turned on the television when I got
home, or got up when the alarm went off.").
40 See EU Economic Governance, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu!
economy-financeleconomic-governance/sgp/indexen.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
11 Lisa Philipps & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic
Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 804 (2009).
42 See id. ("Article 104 of the Pact sets out the consequences for Member States
that breach this requirement, which escalate in severity: completion of a confidential
Commission report, a Council recommendation, publicity requirements, constraints
on borrowing from the European Investment Bank, a required deposit with the
Community, and fines.").
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impact on its deficit as measured by the Stability and Growth Pact. A
commitment device designed with the benefit of hindsight would have
designated such ersatz loans a threat no less serious than ordinary
debt. The failure to precisely define the financially harmful behavior
the Pact aimed to prevent invited precisely the mischief that has left
the Greek economy in ruins and that continues to weigh on global
markets."
3. Enforcement
Enforcement is the third critical question in designing a
commitment device. Enforcement requires the participation of a
referee or, better yet, a judge. A referee serves as a third party with
"moral authority . .. to grant or withhold an exception" or "to make a
discretionary judgment."" A judge would have actual "authority or
physical possession.""
Entrusting car keys to such a judge would provide greater assurance
that a potential drunk driver will be kept from behind the wheel than
relying on a mere referee, who would only be able to counsel an
inebriated companion. In this regard, "collective" commitment devices
stand at a distinct disadvantage to those targeted at individuals.4"
Taken to the extreme, while "the individual can . . . entrust his will to
external institutions or forces, outside his control, that literally make
it impossible for him to change his mind ... there is nothing external
to society." More generally, the broader the collective body
attempting to bind itself, the fewer authoritative third parties capable
of serving as judges or referees exist.
When governments create commitment devices to circumscribe
their freedom of action, the absence of an external institution capable
a See Louise Story et al., Wall St. Helped to Mask Debts Shaking Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2010, at Al (explaining that Greece characterized borrowing as "a currency
trade rather than a loan").
* The European financial crisis validates concerns that such "numerical restraints
were frequently too rigid and were ignored, or worse, that they encouraged gaming, as
governments tried to hide noncompliance through accounting changes or off-budget
spending." Philipps & Stewart, supra note 41, at 805.
See Schelling, Enforcing Rules, supra note 6, at 373.
* See id.
* See id.
4 See Elster, supra note 19, at 1758 (concluding that for this reason "the idea of
collective precommitment emerges as quite fragile").
9 See id. at 1759-60.
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of enforcing discipline becomes a critical limiting factor.o For
example, the establishment of an independent central bank allows a
government to credibly commit to the goal of monetary stability."
Unfortunately, no government can absolutely prevent future
governments from undermining or eliminating those constraints.52
Obviously, constitutions demonstrate that collective commitment
devices can be used to bind governments. At the same time, they
show how far a government must go to impose meaningful constraints
on its future behavior."
The Congressional Supercommittee suffered greatly from the
absence of a judge." Despite its failure to reach agreement on a
combination of spending curbs and revenue increases sufficient to
avoid "painful" spending cuts, neither the Supercommittee nor
Congress flinched as the deadline approached and passed." The result
0 In some cases, that end is achieved through the separation of powers. Id. at
1759.
" See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of
Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1189 (1996) (identifying the
Federal Reserve as a particularly effective commitment device).
52 Ron Paul has famously argued that the Federal Reserve - itself a complex
commitment device to guard against the political temptations of inflationary monetary
policies - should be eliminated. See generally RON PAUL, END THE FED (2009)
(providing a critique of central banking in general and the Federal Reserve in
particular).
5 See Elster, supra note 19, at 1759 (distinguishing between procedural and
substantive constitutional commitments). The U.S. Constitution imposes increased
procedural thresholds for alterations of constitutional mandates. Article V requires
either two-thirds of the House and Senate or two-thirds of state legislatures to propose
an amendment. Approving an amendment requires the consent of three-fourths of
state legislatures. Combining those limitations with a separation of powers among
multiple branches of government makes it even more difficult for government actors
to overturn such preferences by allowing one branch of government to police another.
See id. at 1773 (noting that "separation of powers can facilitate political
precommitment").
" Obligations or prohibitions embedded in a constitution can be entrenched in a
number of ways. Amendment may, for example, take time or require a super-majority
vote. See id. at 1783.
" Rebecca Kysar notes that the absence of an authoritative third party often
hamstrings Congressional efforts to enforce self-discipline by using more temporary
legislation. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009
(2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation] ("Although Congress may adopt
mechanisms - budget rules, for example - with lofty ambitions to legislate in the
public interest and to promote fiscal responsibility, Congress is all but unfettered in its
ability to sidestep these mechanisms when it sees fit.").
5 Although the deadline passed unmet, few seemed to feel that the promised
consequences of failure were inevitable. Even the statement announcing the
committee's failure "left open the possibility of a new stage of negotiations in the full
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might have been far different if, for instance, the International
Monetary Fund had the power to enforce the prescribed sanction.
B. Disabling Tax Expenditure Abuse
The failures of the tax expenditure budget, the Supercommittee, and
the Growth and Stability Pact testify to the long odds governments
face when they choose to bet on commitment devices. Together, they
also highlight the variety of threats such a commitment device must
navigate. As this Part explains, beyond the well-trodden questions of a
device's potency, precision and enforcement lies the possibility that its
designers might have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the
problem. In the case of the tax expenditure budget, conceiving of tax
expenditure abuse as a mere accounting deficiency - to be addressed
by fine-tuning the budget process - guaranteed the project's failure.
1. Ambiguity
Of the shortcomings that have made the tax expenditure budget
such a poor bulwark against tax expenditure abuse, the absence of a
bright-line definition of tax expenditures has consistently received the
most attention." Unfortunately, in the case of tax expenditures,
precision has proven stubbornly elusive."
From the beginning, the tax expenditure budget has been heavily
criticized for relying on a hopelessly ill-defined boundary between tax
expenditures and favorable, but permissible, tax provisions. 9 Simply
put, not every tax benefit is a tax expenditure. Without a consensus
baseline - what Surrey invokes as the "income tax proper" - against
Congress, where lawmakers will try to hammer out an agreement on a tax overhaul,
changes to entitlement programs and new revenues as a way to avoid automatic
across-the-board cuts over 10 years." Jennifer Steinhauer et al., With Collapse of Panel's
Work, Battleground Shifts to the Automatic Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at A18.
7 The tax expenditure budget's first critic focused on the ambiguous definition of
tax expenditures, warning that even if the tax expenditure budget were to "succeed in
bringing some issues to the fore" it would effectively "conceal others" so that "the
claim that tax subsidies have been exposed to the pitiless glare of publicity will itself
help to hide the undisclosed subsidies." Bittker, supra note 14, at 259.
58 Shaviro explains that such ambiguity is inevitable and argues that "Itlax
expenditure analysis ought to be more flexible and varied in its groupings than it is in
the Surrey tradition, where each rule is canonically classified as a tax expenditure or
not. . . ." Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 188.
" See Bittker, supra note 14, at 250 (listing provisions that a "consistent
application" of tax policy principles would require to be included on a tax expenditure
budget).
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which deviations can be pinpointed,"o drawing the line between
permissible preferences and tax expenditures becomes difficult."
Efforts to wring ambiguity from the definition of tax expenditures
have produced an array of alternative approaches. Each offers
advantages over the standard definition of tax expenditures, but none
of them comes close to producing the bright-line result capable of
anchoring an effective commitment device. Using the language of
legislators to divine the presence of an abusive tax expenditure, for
example, would go some way towards decoupling tax expenditure
analysis from Surrey's protean baseline.6 2 Classifying provisions as tax
expenditures only when they are "substitutable" would do the same."
Most recently, a short-lived effort by the influential Congressional
Joint Committee on Taxation simply replaced the disputed baseline
with a modestly idealized version of extant tax laws. 4 Perhaps
inevitably," each of these three alternatives fails to solve the precision
problem.66 None provides clarity that might finally produce "the one
true tax expenditures list.""
60 SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 8, at 6.
61 That poses both direct and indirect obstacles to the success of the tax
expenditure budget as a commitment device. Obviously, errors provide policymakers
with opportunities to exploit budgetary advantage despite the existence of the tax
expenditure budget. In addition, the lack of a consensus baseline erodes the legitimacy
of the tax expenditure budget. The tax expenditure budget has long been criticized for
its reliance on "implicit policy judgments" that can make tax expenditure analysis
appear to be less a search for truth than a Trojan horse for an unstated - and
therefore suspect - agenda. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration
of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALEL.J. 955, 974 (2004).
62 See McIntyre, supra note 6, at 88-89 (proposing a rhetorical trigger for tax
expenditure analysis).
63 See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155,
1156, 1186 (proposing a definition of a tax expenditure "not based on the subjective
idea of a normative income tax" but instead identifying "a 'substitutable tax provision'
as a tax provision that can be replaced with a non-tax-based federal program that
fulfills the current tax provision's purposes at least as effectively as does the current
provision itself").
64 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 39 (2008) (defining tax expenditures as provisions "deliberately
inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law" producing "less
revenue than does the general rule.").
65 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66 Thuronyi notes that McIntyre's solution fails to "liberatel] tax expenditures
from the search for an elusive normative tax." Thuronyi, supra note 63, at 1182.
Weisbach likewise notes that the "'substitutability' approach... is still problematic
since, at least theoretically, every policy is substitutable." Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 61, at 977 n.63. Finally, Fleming and Peroni conclude that the "Joint Committee
Staffs new approach did not effectively overcome" the baseline problem "that the Staff
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Although its most obvious failing, ambiguity is not the tax
expenditure budget's most important flaw. As considered in detail
below, the tax expenditure budget's blindness to an array of pressures
- from parliamentary to psychological - that encourage
policymakers to use tax expenditures overshadows its ambiguity. Even
if a bright line had been easy to draw, tax expenditures would still
have flourished. If that were not the case, those tax expenditures
included in the tax expenditure budget - thereby thrust into the
daylight - would soon wither and die. With few exceptions, that has
not occurred.8
2. Enforceability
Enforcement is a challenge for every collective commitment
device.69 The mechanisms that protect against Congressional
violations of constitutional protections provide a very potent form of
enforcement.o They do not merely provide a referee possessing moral
authority to evaluate compliance, but a judge (here a literal Supreme
Court) possessing actual authority to police violations of
constitutional protections.n
The tax expenditure budget has only referees, such as the many
scholars who have critiqued the tax expenditure budget's
shortcomings, to ensure that the tax expenditure budget is
comprehensive and accurate. 2 As with precision, that limitation is not
as significant as one might expect. For those expenditures that do find
their way onto the tax expenditure budget, enforcement becomes
sought to neutralize with its 2008-2010 construct." J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J.
Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis be Divorced From a Normative Tax Base?: A
Critique of the "New Paradigm" and its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REv. 135, 169 (2010)
[hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Divorced].
67 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 977.
68 Even in cases in which a tax expenditure disappears from the budget, the tax
expenditure budget may be only part of the story. See Dean, supra note 15, at 402 n.61
(concluding that "press accounts of particular abuses" did more to end safe harbor
leasing than "aversion to its design or concerns about its cost").
6 See supra Part II.B.2.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. Of course, flaws in the tax
expenditure budget actually allow Congress to circumvent the constitutional barrier
between church and state. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
n See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
n Scholars could, for example, object to the omission of various provisions from
the tax expenditure budget, but have no authority to force changes in the way the tax
expenditure budget is formulated. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 14 (criticizing
incompleteness of list of tax expenditures).
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largely irrelevant. Once publicized, tax expenditures can no more be
made secret again than the proverbial bell can be un-rung.
Unfortunately, inclusion on the tax expenditure budget seems to mean
little, since even listed tax expenditures can thrive. Even if the tax
expenditure budget accounted fully for each and every tax
expenditure, abuse would still occur."
3. Completeness
Setting aside precision and enforcement - and notwithstanding the
potency it enjoys as a disabling device - the tax expenditure budget
would not have achieved Surrey's goal of containing tax expenditure
abuse. Even a flawless tax expenditure budget would have been
uncomfortably like a student blocking his laptop's internet connection
only to find himself lost in his smart phone's small screen.74 As
explained in detail in Part II, that is because the tax expenditure budget
targets only one of at least three engines of tax expenditure abuse.15
" Taking a step back from the technical details, a never-ending cascade of debts and
deficits suggests that in relying on norms of fiscal probity to promote accountability and
to prevent abuse, the tax expenditure budget booked passage on a ship that, like the
Titanic, was both unsinkable and doomed. Indeed the entire federal budget could be
seen as a failed commitment device. In responding to criticisms of the tax expenditure
budget, Roin draws a similar parallel between the two budgets. See Roin, supra note 4, at
614 ("If the objections to the tax expenditure budget warrant its elimination, they would
also warrant ceasing publication of the remainder of the budget."). Unfortunately, the
"pitiless glare of publicity" that Surrey hoped would prevent tax expenditure abuse
seems to have lost its bite. See Bittker, supra note 14, at 259.
"1 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
7 See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 220-21 (concluding
that cognitive advantage would persist even if budgetary advantage were eliminated).
Using the diagram developed in Part II shows how even an idealized tax expenditure
budget - entirely foreclosing the possibility of budgetary advantage - would fail to
account for two of the three variants of fiscal advantage considered below. Focused
only on budgetary advantage, it ignores both cognitive and procedural advantage.
Ideal Tax
Expenditure
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Take, for example the recent Supreme Court decisions in Winn76 and
the challenge to President Obama's Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act." Although the Arizona legislature classified the Winn credit
as a tax expenditure and included its $50 million annual cost on its
tax expenditure budget, policymakers still had compelling reasons to
substitute a tax credit for a direct expenditure." Using a tax
expenditure allowed Arizona legislators to circumvent constitutional
roadblocks and to exploit psychological quirks that cause the public to
draw false distinctions between tax and direct expenditures. 9
In its decision affirming the constitutionality of the healthcare
legislation, the inadequacy of the tax expenditure budget proved even
more striking. Although the Court found that the federal government
lacked the power to directly compel the purchase of insurance under
the Commerce Clause, the mandate survived as a tax measure. As
Chief Justice Roberts put it, "Congress's power to tax is greater than
its power to regulate commerce."8 o Unfortunately, the tax expenditure
budget - the only tool available to assess the use of tax rules to
achieve substantive ends - offers no insight on Congress's use of its
taxing power to circumvent the limits of the Commerce Clause.
Because it increases rather than decreases the federal government's
revenues, the tax penalty it imposes will simply be ignored.81
Even if tax expenditure abuse were a purely quantitative
phenomenon, our zombie accountant, the tax expenditure budget,
would be poorly equipped to evaluate it. As Winn and the Court's
healthcare decision illustrate, the use of tax expenditures has a
significance that cannot always be reduced to dollars and cents. The
" 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
* Those legislators may have seen benefits as well as costs in the tax expenditure
budget's highlighting of this credit. If the enthusiasm of supporters outweighs the
skepticism of those who disapprove, the publicity provided by the tax expenditure
budget may, on balance, prove favorable.
79 The Arizona tax expenditure budget may have eliminated budgetary advantage,
but it did not affect the tax credit's procedural advantage potential. See Winn, 131 S.
Ct. at 1444.
80 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
8 Such tax penalties are presented as having no cost - that is, the tax
expenditure budget lists the amount of revenue they contribute to the federal revenues
- or are simply ignored. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONGRESS, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011-2015 4 (2012) (describing negative
tax expenditures as "provisions that provide for treatment that is less favorable than
normal income tax law" but excluding "provisions of the law the principal purpose for
which is to . . . prevent the violation of other laws").
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next Part describes a framework that can accommodate the complex
dynamics that motivate the use of tax expenditures.
II. THE ZOMBIE ACCOUNTANT
Unfortunately, dragging tax expenditures into budgetary daylight
has eliminated neither policymakers' opportunities nor incentives to
exploit the fiscal advantage they provide." The blossoming of listed tax
expenditures - that is, those tax provisions that are included in the
tax expenditure budget - in addition to those that are excluded that
followed the codification of the tax expenditure budget as a disabling
device suggests that neither enforcement nor ambiguity is the most
pressing problem." More broadly, a half-century of experience with
the tax expenditure budget offers little reason for optimism that
commitment mechanisms - particularly those less potent than
disabling devices - can succeed in curbing policymakers' bad habits."
82 In prior work, the exploitation of fiscal advantage has been labeled "fiscal
arbitrage." See Dean, supra note 15, at 392 (defining fiscal arbitrage as "reaping the
political benefits of spending without investing the political capital that direct
spending requires"). One advantage of using the term advantage is that in the tax
context arbitrage has acquired a specialized meaning. Tax arbitrage, in particular
suggests the use of offsetting positions that are treated asymmetrically by the tax law,
producing favorable results for taxpayers. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective
Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1189, 1231 (1989) ("Tax arbitrage may
be defined as the reciprocal borrowing and lending of money to give at least one party
tax-exempt interest income and deductible interest expense.").
8 As Shaviro put it, "[t]ax expenditure analysis is like a hardy plant with shallow
roots that spreads widely, resisting the occasional effort to extirpate it, while having
little if any effect on the soils in which it sprouts." Shaviro, Rethinking Tax
Expenditures, supra note 1, at 187. Kleinbard examined data regarding the prevalence
of tax expenditures since the creation of the tax expenditure budget and concluded
that "[tlax expenditures have grown at rates much faster than explicit Government
spending and at rates that exceed even increases in mandatory spending." Kleinbard,
The Congress Within the Congress, supra note 2, at 17.
84 By contrast, some mechanisms used to promote a healthy tax system reward the
faith that is placed in them. Third-party information reporting, for example, has a
dramatic impact on taxpayer compliance. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed
Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695, 698 &
n.13 (2007) (discussing importance of information reporting to taxpayer compliance).
Information reporting is not, of course, a commitment device, but a legally
enforceable obligation imposed on private parties.
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A. Fiscal Superconductors
The traditional method of containing the risk posed by tax
expenditures views them as nothing more than an accounting failure.8 5
This Part provides an alternative with the power to recognize the
many faces of tax expenditure abuse. It does so by developing a new
vocabulary to describe the property that makes tax expenditures
susceptible to abuse.
Tax expenditures are fiscal superconductors. Just as
superconductivity allows electrical currents to flow without resistance,
substituting tax expenditures for direct expenditures allows
policymakers to neutralize impediments to spending. Fiscal advantage
- the benefit offered by that superconductivity - is the phenomenon
that motivates tax expenditure abuse.86
This Part identifies three types of resistance - budgetary, cognitive,
and procedural - that dissipate when tax expenditures are substituted
for direct expenditures."' For those familiar with tax expenditure
analysis, budgetary advantage will be the most recognizable form of
fiscal advantage. Budgetary advantage is what policymakers seek to
gain when they substitute tax expenditures for direct spending that
would be fully captured by the ordinary budget process. It is, as the
label suggests, the phenomenon targeted by the tax expenditure
budget. Simply put, budgetary advantage defeats whatever resistance
to spending the budget process generates. Even today, budgetary
advantage retains its potency wherever there are gaps in the tax
expenditure budget."
The other two forms of fiscal advantage considered here fall beyond
the scope of the tax expenditure budget. In part because of that, they
85 See Roin, supra note 4, at 608-10 (describing the evolution of the tax
expenditure budget into its current form).
86 Shaviro proposed new fiscal language grounded in optimal tax theory to
"rescue[]" tax expenditure analysis from "the vacuity of the distinction between taxes
and spending." Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 212-13. Using
Shaviro's distinction between the two very different functions of the tax expenditure
budget - "a purportedly objective descriptive tool and a weapon of political combat"
- his fiscal language innovation was designed primarily to advance the former
function while highlighting fiscal advantage serves to curtail the abuse of tax
expenditures. See id. at 190.
87 It would be possible to create a categorical definition of tax expenditures in
fiscal advantage terms. For example, any provision exploiting significant quantities of
at least two types of fiscal advantage might be labeled a tax expenditure. One of the
primary advantages of the fiscal advantage concept is that it does not require a
consensus on where such a line should be drawn.
8 See infra note 115.
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may be even more important than budgetary advantage. Cognitive
advantage exploits psychological rather than accounting vulnerabilities
- persuading voters to change their views by changing a measure's
form without altering its substance - but exhibits the same capacity for
obscuring fiscal truths." As scholars have demonstrated, individuals
respond differently to identical fiscal policies when framed as tax and
direct expenditures.o Capitalizing on that disparity could, for example,
allow a subsidy to succeed as a tax provision even though a fiscally
identical spending provision would fail.9 '
The third and final form of fiscal advantage described here,
procedural advantage, is the least understood92 it occurs when
policymakers skirt procedural obstacles by substituting a tax rule for a
spending provision. The use of a tax credit to subsidize private
religious education when a direct expenditure might violate the
Establishment Clause or a tax penalty to avoid the strictures of the
Commerce Clause need not implicate budgetary or cognitive
advantage. Their procedural advantage potential is obvious and
significant."
A prototypical vehicle for tax expenditure abuse exploits budgetary,
cognitive, and procedural advantage.95 For example, the bilateral
" See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 220 (explaining that
"people systematically under-weigh opportunity costs relative to equivalent out-of-
pocket costs" and as a result respond differently to "substantively identical" tax and
spending provisions).
90 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
VA. TAX REv. 797, 799 (2005) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Framing Effects] (explaining that
in some cases "policies unacceptable when framed as direct expenditures become
supportable when labeled as tax subsidies, even though the economic substance of the
policies is the same").
' See id.
9 The Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence that preceded Winn
inspired the most significant discussions of procedural advantage. See Edward A.
Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE LJ. 1165, 1192-94 (1993) [hereinafter
Gucci Gulch] (summarizing scholarly response to Establishment Clause procedural
advantage). For his part, Zelinsky largely dismisses the threat of procedural advantage
in this context, concluding that a tax expenditure "poses less threat to Establishment
Clause values than a comparable direct outlay." Id. at 1194.
9 See Dean, supra note 15, at 425 (providing a brief description of the operation
of procedural advantage).
* See Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447-48
(2011).
5 Likewise, a prototypical lie would possess each of a variety of relevant elements.
See Linda Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57
285
University of California, Davis
double tax treaties considered below - an important tax expenditure
rarely identified as such - draw strength from all three forms of fiscal
advantage.96 Another expenditure might exhibit two of the three. A
marginal example might provide scant opportunity for any sort of
fiscal advantage. Implicit in the fiscal advantage concept is the notion
that each of the three elements is itself a gradient property." In other
words, a tax expenditure might provide little budgetary advantage but
a great deal of cognitive advantage.
B. The Anatomy of Fiscal Advantage
Splintering a concept brings with it a host of risks. Fortunately,
fragmenting the once-indivisible tax expenditure concept is a less
dangerous proposition than, say, splitting the atom." Undoubtedly,
fiscal advantage could be disaggregated further or along different fault
lines. Nevertheless, budgetary, cognitive, and procedural advantage
provide a useful means of teasing apart the interrelated dynamics that
fuel the exploitation of tax expenditures.9 9
LANGUAGE 26, 28 (1981) [hereinafter Coleman & Kay, Lie] ("The notion of prototype
definition suggests that utterances which have all three of the elements above would
be considered full-fledged lies, and that utterances which lack one or more of the
elements might still be classed as lies, but less clearly so. . .
" See infra Part II.B.
97 The magnitude of the fiscal advantage associated with a particular policy is
determined both exogenously and endogenously. Modifying a given tax expenditure
can, for example, enhance or diminish its budgetary advantage potential, but similar
results can also be achieved by altering the legal framework that governs tax
expenditures generally. Still more broadly, social or cultural changes can affect the
perception of a particular provision, significantly affecting its potential for fiscal
advantage. To the extent society simultaneously has become more skeptical of direct
spending and more welcoming of tax expenditures, a tax expenditure may be
unchanged yet have become a better source of fiscal advantage.
98 The word atom is derived from the Greek word meaning "indivisible." See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 73 (10th ed. 1998). Nuclear fission splits
the atom "resulting in the release of large amounts of energy" in power plants and
weapons. See id. at 439.
9 The prototype view of meaning permits a more nuanced view of a word's
meaning than a simple checklist definition. See, e.g., Coleman & Kay, Lie, supra note
95, at 28 ("When we try to define lie, the first thing that comes to mind is probably
the idea of saying something untrue. This, however, is not adequate. . . . Honest
mistakes and innocent misrepresentations occur frequently, and are not labeled lies.").
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1. Budgetary Advantage
Budgetary advantage grants policymakers enormous power to
obscure spending patterns.' The opportunity that unchecked
budgetary advantage would provide can be understood by considering
the roots of the Greek debt crisis. For years, Greece managed to
borrow billions of dollars while keeping the attendant debts "hidden
from public view" simply by mislabeling them.'o' Although its
consequences tend to be less dramatic, budgetary advantage involves
the same fiscal sleight of hand. When successful, it hides spending in
the same brash way."o2
Even today, decades after Congress embraced the use of the tax
expenditure budget, tax laws still provide economic benefits to
discrete groups of taxpayers while shielding the resulting costs from
view. In the extreme, such changes are viewed as having no fiscal
impact.0 3 As with the Greek debt subterfuge, avoiding particular
labels provides policymakers with the fiscal equivalent of Dorian
Gray's portrait.10 4
100 Without a tax expenditure budget, tax expenditures would have only an
"implicit cost" that would be all too easily ignored. See Roin, supra note 4, at 608.
101 See Story et al., supra note 43, at Al.
102 Surrey hoped to prevent - or disable - budgetary advantage by forcing a
public reckoning of tax expenditures' cost. He explained that the tax expenditure
budget would shield a "vulnerable" tax system from tax expenditures. See SURREY,
PATHWAYS supra note 8, at 6 ("A tax system that is so vulnerable to this injection of
extraneous, costly and ill-considered expenditure programs is in a precarious state....
It is therefore imperative that the process and substance of these tax expenditures be
reexamined.").
103 For example, many corporate restructurings are, not without controversy,
ignored by the tax expenditure budget. See Bittker, supra note 14, at 250 (criticizing
the tax expenditure budget's omission of corporate reorganization provisions). As a
result, Congress can loosen the requirements taxpayers must satisfy to qualify for that
favorable treatment without triggering application of the tax expenditure budget. In
part because of that omission, such "spending" remains hidden and tends to be seen as
"simplification" rather than largesse. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 14, 734 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (labeling a loosening of the divisive reorganization
requirements "simplification").
14 In Oscar Wilde's novel, the consequences of Dorian Gray's excesses are
concealed, visible only in a portrait locked away from view.
Ah! in what a monstrous moment of pride and passion he had prayed that
the portrait should bear the burden of his days, and he keep the unsullied
splendour of eternal youth! All his failure had been due to that. Better for
him that each sin of his life had brought its sure swift penalty along with it.
There was purification in punishment.
OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 282 (Limited Ed. Club ed., George Macy
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Fortunately, not every fiscal sin can be hidden from the public eye
so easily. The tax expenditure budget provides a public reckoning of
the cost of a wide range of tax preferences. " Thanks in part to the tax
expenditure budget, some of those once-obscure preferences receive
quite a bit of attention.o6 The deduction for interest paid on a home
mortgage, for example, absorbs ninety billion dollars of tax revenue
per year.1 7 Without the tax expenditure budget, there might be no
official recognition of the cost of one of the largest homeownership
subsidies. 10
Along with such high-profile tax expenditures, many others exist
that receive less attention. 109 For example, the deduction for
overnight-travel expenses of national guard and reserve members
reduces tax revenues by a hundred million dollars per year. 110
Compiling a long list of tax expenditures in a single document goes a
long way towards defusing the threat of budgetary advantage.
Despite the existence of the tax expenditure budget, budgetary
advantage remains problematic for two reasons. First, because of the
Co. 1957) (1890).
1os See Roin, supra note 4, at 608 (explaining that the tax expenditure budget
"estimates the revenue the government would have collected in the absence of those
provisions, and thus the implicit cost of these provisions").
106 The tax expenditure budget has gained considerable attention in the context of
recent budget crises. Its cost estimates draw particular attention to those tax
expenditures linked to substantial revenue losses. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Ending
Tax Breaks Won't Fix Budget, Study Says, WASH. POST, May 31, 2011, at A08 ("Known
as 'tax expenditures,' the list includes dozens of popular credits, deductions and other
policies that benefit many special interests, but also millions of ordinary taxpayers.
The most expensive tax breaks from the government's standpoint are the tax-free
treatment of employer-provided health benefits and the mortgage-interest deduction
for homeowners.").
I See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014, at 34-54 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter
ESTIMATES BY BUDGET FUNCTION].
1I The exclusion for imputed income derived from the ownership of durable
goods, including owner occupied real estate, by contrast, is excluded from the tax
expenditure budget and typically goes unremarked upon. See id. at 6 ("The individual
income tax does not include in gross income the imputed income that individuals
receive from the services provided by owner-occupied homes and durable goods.
However, the Joint Committee staff does not classify this exclusion as a tax
expenditure.") (footnotes omitted).
" Virtually any policy that could be supported with a direct expenditure of funds
could be replaced with a tax subsidy. David Bradford even playfully suggested that
weapons appropriations could be replaced with a "weapons supply tax credit." David
F. Bradford, Tax Expenditures and the Problem of Accounting for Government, in TAX
EXPENDITURES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 427, 432 (Neil Bruce ed., 1988).
110 See ESTIMATES BY BUDGET FUNCTION, supra note 107, at 34-54.
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lack of precision considered above, some tax rules that provide
opportunities for budgetary advantage fail to find their way onto the
tax expenditure budget."' The U.S. network of bilateral double tax
treaties illustrates that shortcoming. Surrey himself concluded that
preferences provided through the tax treaty process should be
considered tax expenditures, but they continue to be excluded from
the tax expenditure budget."'
That failure could be viewed as a modest one, in which specific
features of particular treaties permit fiscal advantage."' Alternatively,
it could be seen as a more profound structural weakness that permits
states to conspire to surreptitiously undermine domestic laws through
international law."' Particularly under that broader view, by
ni See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
11 Surrey and McDaniel broadly distinguish between treaty benefits accorded to
U.S. residents (tax expenditures) and those provided to foreign businesses and
individuals (not tax expenditures), noting that:
[Some treaties do reduce the U.S. income tax on its citizens and residents.
When such a reduction would result in a tax expenditure if legislated in a
statute then a treaty provision producing the same effect should likewise be
considered a tax expenditure. The U.S. tax expenditure lists, however, have
not yet applied this analysis.
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 168-70 (1985) [hereinafter
SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES]. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL & STANLEY S. SURREY,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 59 (1985)
[hereinafter McDANIEL & SURREY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES]. Surrey
and McDaniel identify treaty provisions making contributions to foreign charities
deductible and treating certain loans as "income taxes" for foreign tax credit purposes
(even though the relevant statute would provide less favorable treatment) as
improperly omitted tax expenditures. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra, at 169-70. They distinguish between those tax expenditures and a third treaty
provision in part because analogous statutory rules "have never been listed as tax
expenditures." Id. at 170.
13 See ESTIMATES BY BUDGET FUNCTION, supra note 107, at 34-54 (listing
international tax expenditures such as "[e]xclusion of certain allowances for Federal
employees abroad" but omitting tax treaty-based tax preferences).
114 In the tax treaty context McDaniel and Surrey disregard benefits accorded to
nonresidents. See McDANIEL & SURREY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 112, at 59 ("The lack of generally accepted normative principles precludes
classification of provisions affecting foreign individuals and corporations in domestic
legislation or tax treaties as either normative or tax expenditures . . . ."). Nevertheless,
because of the reciprocal nature of tax treaties any benefits provided to nonresidents
indirectly accrue to residents. Although the mechanism is less direct than a direct
Congressional grant of a tax benefit, the results (lost U.S. tax revenue paired with tax
benefits for U.S. residents) is the same. The United States teams with its treaty partner
to produce results that it would have difficulty achieving alone. A similar
phenomenon can occur in the context of cross-border military intervention against a
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expanding treaty benefits, policymakers can provide benefits to
favored constituencies without observing the strictures of the tax
expenditure budget process. In either case, as shown in the following
diagram, although tax treaties benefit from fiscal advantage (here
budgetary advantage), the tax expenditure budget blithely ignores
these preferences.
Figure 1
Tax Treaty Tax Expenditure
Preferences udgeta Budget
Advantage
Second, the tax expenditure budget systematically underestimates
the cost of tax expenditures that are included on the tax expenditure
budget."' As a result, not even labeling tax treaty preferences as tax
expenditures would reliably eliminate the risk that they might
facilitate budget advantage."' Producing even a rough cost estimate
that might be included on a tax expenditure budget would represent a
challenge."'
non-state actor, with one state acting militarily in the territory of a second state to
address a threat that it is "unwilling or unable" to resolve on its own. See Ashley S.
Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-
Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (2012) (discussing need for greater clarity in when a
state may invoke the "unwilling or unable" standard).
"' That is true, for example, when taxpayers change their behavior to capitalize on
a tax preference, making it difficult to quantify its precise fiscal impact. In other
words, repealing a tax on chocolate chip cookies that once generated $100 in revenues
may actually reduce revenues by more than $100 as consumers abandon oatmeal
cookies still subject to tax. See ESTIMATES BY BUDGET FUNCTION, supra note 107, at 28
("IU]nlike revenue estimates, tax expenditure calculations do not incorporate the
effects of the behavioral changes that are anticipated to occur in response to the repeal
of a tax expenditure provision.").
116 See Roin, supra note 4, at 613 ("[Mlany suspect that the tax expenditure
budget, as currently formulated, makes many [estimation] errors, perhaps enough to
make the schedule worse than useless").
117 For example, Surrey and McDaniel conclude that treaty reductions in gross-
basis withholding rates (i.e., cross-border taxes that apply without any allowance for
expenses) should not be treated as tax expenditures "because such reductions are
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2. Cognitive Advantage
Budgetary advantage is the best understood of the three forms of
fiscal advantage. For decades, it has been the object of both careful
scrutiny and determined eradication efforts. Cognitive advantage has
only recently begun to attract attention from scholars.""
In a sense, budgetary and cognitive advantage represent two sides of
the same coin. Both presume a relatively high level of public
engagement with fiscal policy issues. Cognitive advantage paints a
more recognizably human portrait of consumers of fiscal policy
information."' It accounts for the fact that voters (but not
policymakers) may be dismissive of the tax expenditure budget or
simply fail to look beyond the ordinary budget. In addition, it
acknowledges that both voters and policymakers might digest the
generally attempts to make the tax burden closer to what would be imposed if the
regular tax rate schedule were applied to net investment income." SURREY &
McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 112, at 168. In effect, they argue, reductions
in gross basis withholding taxes amount to reductions in tax penalties, the converse of
tax expenditures. It would be extremely difficult to determine when treaty-based rate
reductions cease serving as tax penalty adjustments and become tax expenditures. For
example, although by the above logic a treaty that entirely eliminates the statutory
withholding tax should be viewed as giving rise to a tax expenditure, the dollar value
of that benefit would be hard to estimate. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. X, It 3, July 24, 2001 U.S.T. 5668
(eliminating the withholding tax in cases in which a -U.K. parent owns eighty percent
of the shares of a U.S. subsidiary).
118 The first scholarship applying the insights of cognitive psychology to taxation
appeared many years after the tax expenditure budget was enshrined in federal law.
See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861, 1864
(1994) ("My central argument is that cognitive biases can help to explain major
structural features of our existing tax system that are otherwise difficult to
understand, and that such biases must be taken into account in developing any
general normative theory of tax.")
119 The traditional take on budgetary advantage makes two unrealistic assumptions
about voters. First, it takes for granted that voters successfully digest all available
budget information. Second, budgetary advantage works best when voters have no
capacity to generate it themselves. In a world in which only budgetary advantage plays
an important role, voters would respond rationally to the spending and subsidies that
appear in the federal budget even though they are unable to look beyond that official
reckoning. When the fiscal impact of a tax measure is revealed to them, they
appreciate its significance, but the information must always be presented to them. A
formal tax expenditure budget, translating tax rules into their spending equivalents,
offers an easy antidote for budgetary advantage. Presented with its fuller fiscal picture,
voters are able to appreciate the budget impact of tax preferences.
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information it contains, but stubbornly reject the equivalence of
substantively identical tax and spending provisions.'
Cognitive advantage suggests the complexity of the channels
through which fiscal advantage operates. It also highlights its
unpredictability. Because it introduces an irrational element into the
tax policy process, cognitive advantage produces surprising outcomes.
For instance, cognitive advantage can create distributional quirks such
as tax rules that benefit relatively high-income taxpayers.121 As
Marjorie Kornhauser concisely put it, "the public might not tolerate
handing out dollars to every hedge fund trader, but will not notice if
these traders receive the money by means of favorable tax
treatment." 2 2 In other words, voters may tend to miss the forest
(because of the types and amount of income they earn, the wealthy
benefit disproportionately from favorable capital gains rates) by
focusing on the trees (low-income taxpayers are entitled to an even
lower rate).
Behavioral tax scholars offer a clear account of why such odd results
might persist. Individuals engage in "disaggregation" and suffer from
"isolation bias" when they evaluate a tax expenditure. In other
120 See Zelinsky, Framing Effects, supra note 90, at 801 ("For those who persist in
viewing economically equivalent programs as different when framed as tax or as direct
expenditure programs, disclosure is irrelevant. The essence of a framing effect is its
persistence in the face of disclosure, such as that embodied in tax expenditure
budgets."). Some have been skeptical of the impact of cognitive advantage. See, e.g.,
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 971 ("Psychological problems may prevent
individuals from properly processing information, but this does not mean that such
cognitive biases are dominant, or even important, in this context."). Policymakers may
also fall victim to the same cognitive failures they exploit in taxpayers, sincerely
believing that fiscally identical tax and spending measures to be fundamentally
different. See Kleinbard, Framework, supra note 5, at 354 ("Congress both operates
through and capitalizes on the prism of fiscal illusion.").
1I On the other hand, tax expenditures may represent the only vehicle through
which programs that benefit moderate-income recipients can be created. See Fleming
& Peroni, Reinvigorating, supra note 5, at 485-86 ("[Flollowing the 1994 Republican
takeover of Congress, the Clinton administration and Congress collaborated in using
tax expenditures to adopt governmental programs that could not be enacted via the
direct expenditure approach in the then-prevailing political environment. Among
these tax expenditures were higher education tax credits and a child tax credit. This
history suggests that in certain circumstances, tax expenditures can be used to
accomplish worthy governmental objectives that could not otherwise be done through
the legislative system.").
122 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 264 (2009).
123 See Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its
Absence), in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 85, 85-87 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel
Slemrod eds., 2006) (describing implications of disaggregation and isolation bias).
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words, they evaluate a tax measure on its own terms, failing to follow
the ripples it disperses across the entire fiscal pond. 124 Tax
expenditures heighten the impact of that mental mistake by using
"goal framing" to emphasize benefits over costs. 125 As a result, not only
is the nominally progressive capital gains preference Kornhauser
alludes to considered in isolation from its ultimate distributional
consequences, it also benefits by focusing attention on the goal of
promoting investment and away from the costs of doing so. 26
Neutralizing budgetary advantage requires the publication of more
comprehensive fiscal information, effectively dragging Dorian Gray's
portrait into the light. The antidote to cognitive advantage is less
obvious.'2 7 A "nudge" might ameliorate the impact of other cognitive
failures by, for example, guiding children towards healthier lunch
choices.12 8 Unfortunately, when they are exploiting - rather than
suffering from - cognitive failure, dissuading policymakers from
deploying cognitive advantage as a political tool would require more
than a nudge. 129
124 McCaffery and Baron offer an example that contrasts aggregation against
isolation. In their example, a couple divorces and one former spouse dies, leaving all
her property to the oldest child. The survivor believes in equality, so is left with the
quandary of whether to pursue equality in isolation (leaving half of his estate to each
child) or in the aggregate (by leaving his entire estate to the younger child). Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the
Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
230, 232 (2003).
125 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of
Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679, 682 (2004).
126 The rates applicable to capital gains are progressive (higher rates apply to
taxpayers with higher incomes) but they are also preferential (lower than the rates
that apply to ordinary income). See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2008). As a result, if high
income taxpayers earn a disproportionate share of that income from capital gains, the
preference relative to ordinary income is likely be more important than that nominal
progressivity.
12 Shaviro suggests that tax expenditure analysis could partially defuse the threat
of cognitive advantage. See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 221
("The big contribution that tax expenditure analysis potentially can make is to
counter. . . perceptual bias through a reformulation of our fiscal language.").
128 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 1-3 (2008) (describing a hypothetical scenario in
which the director of food services for a public school system realizes that by
arranging the way in which food is presented to students can encourage them to make
healthier choices).
129 Third parties could disseminate corrective information, such as a brief
explanation as to why a provision should be - but is not - a direct expenditure. To
the extent that it mirrors the role played by the tax expenditure budget does with
respect to budgetary advantage, the utility of such information could be limited.
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Returning to the tax treaty example, even a perfect tax expenditure
budget would not strip tax treaties of their pedigree as the backbone of
the international tax regime. Tracing their origins as far back as the
League of Nations, tax treaties have long been perceived as the weapon
that vanquished the scourge of double taxation.13 Given that
privileged status, it is easy for voters - and perhaps even
policymakers - to draw a false distinction between a generous tax
treaty provision and a cash subsidy.
Each bilateral tax treaty in effect asks whether promoting trade and
investment between the United States and a potential treaty partner is
desirable, eliding the question of whether the cost and distributional
implications of doing so are justified. The answer to the former may be
yes, even if the answer to the latter would be no."' The resulting
cognitive advantage, particularly when coupled with the budgetary
advantage that tax treaties make possible, allows policymakers to
spend indirectly when direct spending would be very difficult. 3 As
illustrated in Figure 2, tax treaties draw strength from both forms of
fiscal advantage while remaining absent from the tax expenditure
budget.
130 See Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 939
(2000) ("The prevailing view regarding tax treaties emphasizes their role as the
indispensable mechanism for alleviating double taxation of international
transactions.").
1' The result is a "preference reversal" in which voters find themselves supporting
a policy they do not actually favor. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Tax
Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality: The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA
L. REv. 1745, 1772 (2005) (using the phrase "preference reversal" to describe that
phenomenon).
13 See Zelinsky, Framing Effects, supra note 90 at 799.
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Figure 2




Whenever two paths from idea to enactment diverge, procedural
advantage can take root. Those differences may be the product of
parliamentary rules that govern the legislative process.133 For example,
both tax expenditures and direct appropriations can be enacted as
temporary measures. However, for budget purposes only the temporal
limitations applied to tax expenditures are given effect.' 3  Direct
expenditures of sufficient size are deemed to be permanent rather than
temporary.3 3 The procedural advantage gained by turning temporary
cash subsidies into temporary tax expenditures may have helped make
"the use of sunset provisions in the tax context . . . rampant." 13
The disparities procedural advantage exploits tend to be
idiosyncratic. As a result, even if Congress were to eliminate the
difference in the treatment of temporary tax and direct expenditures,
133 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 525 (2009) [hereinafter Kysar, Listening to
Congress] (noting that "each house may choose from several different procedural
frameworks in enacting legislation").
" See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 55, at 1018-19 (observing that sunset
provisions applicable to tax measures are taken into account in producing budget
estimates while direct expenditure sunsets are ignored).
"' See id.
136 See id. at 1010 ("At the beginning of the most recent century, for example, more
than one hundred sunset provisions threatened tax legislation with automatic
cessation, including some of the largest tax cuts in American history . . . . [In the
early 1990s, less than two dozen relatively inconsequential tax provisions were set to
expire.").
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the procedural advantage evidenced in Winn would be unaffected.13 A
generic pledge by policymakers to extend any procedural constraint
on direct spending to tax expenditures would provide a
comprehensive remedy for procedural advantage. 38 Unfortunately, it
would rely on a capacity for self-restraint that has long proven
elusive.139
In addition to generating budgetary and cognitive advantage, as
represented in Figure 3, tax treaties also capitalize on a dramatic form
of procedural advantage. Quite simply, because they are treaties, they
bypass the House of Representatives on their road to ratification."
Unlike every other type of tax measure, treaty-based tax expenditures
need not originate in the House. Negotiating and ratifying treaties
require only the participation of the Senate and the Executive.
According to longstanding practice, the House plays no role in the
creation of tax treaties.141
" See Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447-49
(2011). Surrey and McDaniel provide a comprehensive examination of the
constitutional aspects of procedural advantage. See SURREY & McDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 112, at 122-41 (tracing relevance of tax expenditure concept
in racial and sex discrimination, religious freedom and free speech cases).
1" Such a pledge might require that tax expenditures "be presented as spending in
future budgets" so that they "would go through the same legislative processes as do
explicit spending proposals, including referral to the appropriate authorization
committee." Kleinbard, Hidden Hand, supra note 15, at 22 (proposing that "tax
expenditures" be made "explicitly on-budget spending programs" so that "the size of
government would no longer be hidden" and "all uses of government funds would
compete on an open, level playing field").
"9 To help provide Congress with the discipline it has long lacked, Kysar suggests
a rule of statutory interpretation that would limit the availability of "earmarks." See
generally Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 133 (concluding that Congress lacks
the capacity for self-restraint necessary to make its internal anti-earmark rules
effective).
140 See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALEJ. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034904.
1' See id.
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Figure 3
Tax Treaty Tax Expenditure
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Ill. REQUIEM FOR A ZOMBIE
Death did nothing to slow the tax expenditure budget's rise as a
bureaucrat.'4 2 As it has for years, it assigns values that, ironically,
become more important as the tax expenditure budget's inability to
prevent tax expenditure abuse becomes more obvious. This Part offers
an alternative to the tax expenditure budget's pursuit of a
mathematical solution to the threat of tax expenditure abuse."'
Like any autopsy, a detailed examination of the tax expenditure
budget's flaws provides valuable insights." One insight applies
broadly. Demonstrating not merely that the tax expenditure budget
failed to accomplish Surrey's goal, but that it did so despite being a
disabling device, urges caution in deploying less robust commitment
devices to curb policymakers' bad habits. If the equivalent of burning
the ships fails, it would be folly to expect a better result from moving
them just a bit further from the shore.
142 As a commitment device, the tax expenditure budget has been dead for years.
See supra Part I.B.l.
143 Its approach is one answer to the call for a richer, more nuanced means of
analyzing tax expenditures that can account for, by way of example, their
distributional impact. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive
Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAx L. 1, 6 (2011) [hereinafter Sugin, Distributive Justice]
("Today's tax reform debate needs a new kind of tax expenditure budget that would
better inform policymakers about the nature of the benefits that individuals obtain
from tax expenditures, who really enjoys benefits, and who would bear the economic
loss that would follow their repeal.").
114 Admittedly, conducting an autopsy on a zombie may seem a bit cruel.
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The other insight relates more narrowly to the question of tax
expenditures. Simply put, the tax expenditure budget's demise reflects
the failure of a concept rather than its execution. The attempt to define
tax expenditures - rather than a failure to adequately define them -
doomed the tax expenditure budget."'
To acknowledge that sobering reality without sacrificing vigilance
against fiscal advantage, this Part rejects the categorical ("yes or no")
in favor of the gradient ("more or less")."' That shift makes it possible
to place "the proper choice of emphasis""' on the complex
motivations driving tax expenditure abuse, producing a "more varied
and informative tax expenditure analysis.""' Abandoning the effort to
craft a one-size-fits-all definition of a tax expenditure (or, for that
matter, tax expenditure abuse) represents a tactical retreat rather than
a surrender. Like replacing a contested rule with a consensus standard,
embracing fiscal advantage analysis facilitates a particularized
discourse among those with different perspectives in place of a
theoretical foodfight.'49
"I The "blurry edges" of the tax expenditure category leave little room for hope
that a perfect "checklist" definition of tax expenditures could ever serve as a lynchpin
for a commitment device. See Coleman & Kay, Lie, supra note 95, at 27.
"6 Rejecting the checklist for the prototype allows for "degrees of membership" in
a given category. See id. Put differently, it concedes that just as a table may be a better
example of furniture than a lamp or one untrue statement may be considered more of
a lie than another, there are both prototypical and marginal vehicles for tax
expenditure abuse. See id. at 28 (concluding that a "prototypical lie . . . is
characterized by (a) falsehood, which is (b) deliberate and (c) intended to deceive").
147 See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 218 ("Tax expenditure
analysis is too inherently flexible a tool to have only one or a single set of narrowly
defined purposes. . . . The proper choice of emphasis may depend on where one's
interests lie . . . .").
11 Id. at 219 (arguing that a more flexible and informative approach is important
but "verges on the radical" in light of "the aftershocks from Surrey's initial decision to
present it as a purely budgetary tool").
149 A standard can provide a platform for a subsequent debates, eliminating the
need to Teach an ex ante consensus on a politically or conceptually thorny topic. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 965 ("Sometimes people
can agree on a standard when they cannot agree on its specification. An incompletely
specified provision may be the best the political (or judicial) system can do."). If
distributional concerns were paramount, a less formulaic approach would, for
example, allow observers to distinguish among tax expenditures with different
distributional implications even if their revenue cost were identical.
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A. Failure by Definition
Tax policy experts have seen this horror movie before. In the "first
great tax shelter war,"' faced with the daunting definitional challenge
tax shelters presented, tax authorities decided not to try."' That
apparent capitulation cleared a path towards the government's greatest
victory against tax shelters. 2
Authorities shrank from the fight to define tax shelters and instead
identified a characteristic glaringly absent in prototypical shelters and
also lacking in more marginal examples. By doing so, they brought an
end to a wave of shelters that spanned the 1970s and 1980s.' 53 The
passive loss rules made a definition unnecessary by stripping tax
benefits from far-away doctors and dentists when they inevitably failed
to "materially participate" in the business at the core of the tax
shelter. "'
150 Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st
Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAx NOTES 1721, 1737 (2003) (describing the period
preceding the adoption of § 469 as "the first great tax shelter war"). The passive loss
limitations of § 469 rejected the checklist approach to identifying tax shelters. 26
U.S.C. § 469 (West 2005) (limiting deductions attributable to passive activities).
Rather than attempting to create such a checklist, Congress seized on an essential
characteristic of tax shelters - the passive involvement of those seeking deductions
- to identify the most serious abuses. Generally, the passive loss rules limit the
deductions related to activities in which a taxpayer's involvement is not "regular,
continuous, and substantial." Id. § 469(h). The statute makes no attempt to define a
tax shelter.
15 A robust definition of a tax shelter has proven elusive. Michael Graetz provides
the pithiest: a "deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would
be very stupid." Tom Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al. Despite
that, identifying a prototypical tax shelter is child's play. When seven doctors and a
dentist overpay for a dusty motel they have never seen in order to cut the tax bills
associated their respective practices, it is hard not to see the transaction as an abusive
tax shelter. See Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 752, 767-68 (1975), affd, 544
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting taxpayers' characterization of transaction as a
purchase entitling them to deduct interest and depreciation on the Thunderbird
Motel).
152 See Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, a Tasket: Basheting and Corporate Tax Shelters,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (2011) ("The passive activity loss rules were in fact
highly effective in combating this breed of shelters because the high-income taxpayers
who invested in them did not participate in the underlying activities; they simply
invested passively.").
" A prototypical tax shelter may be best described as a transaction that produces
benefits for investors without any effort on their part. The passive loss limitations use
that characteristic to identify - and segregate losses produced by - such tax shelters.
See 26 U.S.C. § 469 (segregating "passive activity losses" that do not involve the
"material participation" of would-be beneficiaries from other income).
15 Section 469's success is driven by the fact that it employs tax shelters' key
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Like authorities' early efforts to define a tax shelter,"' attempts to
define a tax expenditure employ what linguists refer to as a "checklist"
approach.1 5 ' Both rely on a "list of features" to describe the "set of
necessary and sufficient conditions which a thing must satisfy in order
to be an instance of the category labeled by the word."' Fortunately,
the need for that bright-line checklist definition of a tax expenditure is
merely an artifact of the doomed effort to prevent tax expenditure
abuse with a disabling device." 8
characteristic - investor passivity - to identify tax shelters. Fiscal advantage
replicates that feat with respect to tax expenditure abuse. Just as policymakers value
tax expenditures for their fiscal advantage potential, busy doctors and dentists prized
tax shelters like the Thunderbird Motel purchase precisely because they did not need
to devote time to them. Unlike the spirited advertising executive and aspiring farmer
in Nickerson, most taxpayers wanted no part of the hours of manual labor required to
operate a farm or motel. See generally Nickerson v. Comm'r, 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that the Tax Court's finding that profit was not the taxpayer's primary
goal in owning a dairy farm was clearly erroneous). Both target abuse without
providing a checklist definition of the abusive behavior in question.
"I See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules,
62 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1, 16 (1988) (describing 1973 proposal to impose a "limitation on
artificial accounting losses," which were "defined as 'that portion of any loss,
attributable to an activity or related activities, which would disappear if the taxpayer
had no accelerated deductions in the current year').
"' See Coleman & Kay, Lie, supra note 95, at 26-27. Tax expenditures present a
similar line-drawing dilemma. Traditionally, tax expenditures have been described as
subsidies "grafted on to the structure of the income tax proper. . . ." SURREY,
PATHWAYS, supra note 8, at 6. While an easy definition to apply to prototypical tax
expenditures, this definition spawns endless disagreements in other cases. The lack of
consensus regarding the contours of an ideal - subsidy-free - income tax makes it
hard to distinguish interloper from unwitting host. See Bittker, supra note 14, at 249
(noting that to calculate a tax expenditure budget "we must first construct an ideal or
correct income tax structure").
.' Coleman & Kay, Lie, supra note 95, at 26. The category may be expansive or
may only refer to a "single 'sense"' of a concept. Id. at 26. The traditional definition is
broad while newer approaches define tax expenditures in various senses. The original
formulation wielded rhetorical firepower but served as a Rorschach test for an
observer's attitude towards tax incentives. See Thuronyi, supra note 63, at 1158 ("In a
rhetorically brilliant move, Surrey argued that certain tax provisions should not be
considered tax provisions. Rather, these provisions, which Surrey defined as 'tax
expenditures,' were in the nature of government spending programs that happened to
be administered through the tax laws."). Alternative formulations have attempted to
obviate that failure by calving more tightly focused definitions from the generic
version. That approach renders the tax expenditure concept so technical as to deepen
rather than dissipate the fog of confusion that has long surrounded the concept. See
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
158 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 976 ("Surrey's arguments . . .
generally condemn tax expenditures, so such labeling becomes extremely important.
Being put on the tax expenditures list indicates that a provision is a subsidy or
300
2012] The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant
B. An End to the Foodfight
Ending the first great tax shelter war did not require policymakers
to distill the entire universe of potential tax shelters - from dusty
motels to chinchilla farms - down to a single definition. Instead, the
answer proved to be the identification of an attribute that made tax
shelters objectionable.159 For tax shelters, the solution was sloth.
Taxpayers failing to satisfy a material participation threshold sacrificed
their ability to offset tax shelter losses against unrelated income.
Fiscal advantage may not be one of the seven deadly sins, but in the
tax expenditure context it might be even worse. Voters can identify
and, should they choose to do so, punish politicians guilty of pride,
greed, or envy, but the power of fiscal advantage derives from its
capacity to bamboozle the public. Policymakers exploit fiscal
advantage to camouflage fiscal largesse, robbing voters of their ability
to enforce fiscal discipline, violating notions of distributional fairness
or even skirting constitutional barriers.
1. Tax Apps
In recent years, the question of why tax expenditures deserve to be
condemned has become an important subtext of the scholarly debate
over whether tax expenditures deserve to be condemned. The
orthodox view among tax scholars has long denigrated tax
expenditures.160 That skepticism can be traced to Surrey.16 1 In Surrey's
view, tax expenditures were misbegotten government programs that
policymakers would not "be willing to defend in substantive terms
were the programs cast as direct expenditure programs. . . ."2 For
Surrey the tax expenditure label was not neutral, but pejorative. That
view remains dominant - but not universal - among tax experts.
government largesse, while staying off that list indicates that a provision has the
patina of good tax policy.").
1" See Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating
Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAx REv. 879, 880-81 (2007) (describing process by
which passive loss rules identified non-prototypical tax shelter transactions in order to
disallow tax shelter losses).
160 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. Rev. 705, 737
(1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives] (arguing that "existing tax incentives
represent expenditures of funds that in many cases should be dispersed directly").
161 See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at 187-88 (describing
Surrey as tax expenditure analysis's "original U.S. proponent").
162 Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 160, at 727.
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At its core the tax expenditure concept merely highlights the
equivalence between the two basic instruments of fiscal policy.
Spending and taxation represent two distinct valves on the flow of
funds between government and the public. Loosely speaking,
adjustments made to one could offset changes made in the other. That
means a jurisdiction could compensate for a $1,000 increase in the tax
burden on each citizen by increasing per capita spending by the same
amount.
Obviously, tax and spending policies are fraternal rather than
identical twins. They have much in common, but few would be fooled
by a substitution of one for the other. Differences in timing and in the
distribution of burdens and benefits, for instance, make it clear that
the relationship between tax and spending policies is complex.16 3 The
more difficult question is whether those differences give one fiscal
instrument an inherent edge over the other.
In theory, the answer is a simple no. One could, for example,
imagine a substantively identical college tuition subsidy assuming
either the form of a tax incentive administered by the Internal
Revenue Service or a direct expenditure administered by the
Department of Education.'6 In the real world, structural differences
across bureaucracies produce significantly different results for tax and
direct expenditures.'
A resonant example of such a difference is that social welfare
agencies typically measure a potential beneficiary's eligibility over
short intervals rather than the annual periods traditional in the tax
context.'6 6 For a would-be recipient, even the potential for a brief
delay in the availability of subsistence aid produced by relying on the
163 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 582 (1995) (noting tension between tax
and spending programs reflected in efforts to reconcile the annual period employed in
the tax context and the shorter periods traditional in poverty relief programs); Federal
Spending Received Per Dollar of Taxes Paid by State, 2005, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/266.html (showing the dramatic
geographic differences in federal spending per dollar of federal tax paid - in 2005,
New Mexico, for example, received more than twice as much in spending for each
dollar of federal tax paid than New Jersey).
164 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 962-63 (describing alternative tax
and direct spending strategies for implementing a college subsidy).
16' Alstott notes that concerted efforts have been made to alleviate the timing
problem she describes, but that the mechanism designed to alleviate the hardship was
"rarely used". See Alstott, supra note 163, at 581.
166 See id. at 581-84 (observing difficulty of ameliorating differences arising from
this type of "underlying institutional dilemma").
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tax bureaucracy could be significant. Eliminating those asymmetries
can be surprisingly difficult.''
Returning to the hypothetical college subsidy, the tax system is
likely to be an administratively suboptimal tool for aiding needy
students. On the other hand, piggybacking on the existing tax
infrastructure creates the potential for significant efficiencies. In an
extreme case, a tax expenditure could replace two bureaucracies with
one.' 8 From one point of view, which approach would best serve the
needs of students - and the public interest - would depend on an
objective comparison of the institutional alternatives. Here, borrowing
a leaky bucket (i.e., the tax system) to subsidize education in order to
minimize administrative costs might be the better option. Depending
on the rate of the leaks and the likely costs of creating a bespoke
bucket, using a tax expenditure might represent a sound policy
choice.16 9
From this institutional choice perspective, a policymaker is
presented with the same banal choice as a stargazer deciding whether
to add an "app" to her smartphone or to buy an equivalent, single-
purpose product. Obviously, a celestial navigation app takes up less
space in a pocket than a spiral-bound sky atlas.' 70 Nevertheless, even if
ideal for the casual user, the app might not be the right fit for a serious
stargazer, particularly if her favorite spot lacks reliable mobile phone
service or convenient outlets. Likewise, a policymaker may choose or
reject a tax expenditure as a tool for implementing a given policy after
weighing the costs and benefits of each alternative.
167 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 962 (explaining that "[sletting up" a
direct college subsidy "program would be complex and would take significant
resources" but that "a similar program could be implemented through the tax system
by allowing individuals to subtract or add the same amounts to their taxes").
16' See id. at 981 (characterizing the choice between a direct spending welfare
program and a similar tax program as a "tradeoff . . . between the simplicity benefits
of" bureaucratic economies of scale and "the accuracy benefits of" creating a dedicated
administrative infrastructure).
170 The popular SkyVoyager iPhone application could replace an old-fashioned
spiral-bound sky atlas by "accurately show[ing] the sky from anywhere on Earth, at
any time up to 100 years in the past or future." Compare Products, ShySafari 3- for
iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch, SOUTHERN STARS, http://www.southemstars.com/
products/skysafari/index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2012) (star chart application for
iOS), with ROGER SINOTT, Si<Y & TELESCOPE'S POCKET SKY A-TLAs (2006) (spiral bound
sky atlas).
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2. Tax Expenditure Abuse
Although it was offered in part as a refutation of Surrey's position,
Weisbach and Nussim's app view of tax expenditures - seeing tax
expenditures as just another arrow in policymakers' quiver - is not
irreconcilable with "Surrey's substantive argument . . . that tax
expenditures are an inferior method of implementing policy.""' Read
differently, Surrey's skepticism might not insist that they are
inherently harmful, but that these tax apps represent an avenue
through which inferior policies are too easily and therefore too often
implemented. 72  In other words, because they are fiscal
superconductors they lend themselves all too easily to abuse in the
hands of policymakers, frequently producing policies that would not
survive as direct expenditures. The result is a tax code left as cluttered
as an app-filled smartphone.1 3
While the tax expenditure budget has stoked a great deal of
controversy over the years, few have challenged Surrey's skepticism
with respect to tax expenditures. Weisbach and Nussim's insistence
that each potential tax expenditure be judged objectively on its own
merits represents the most recent noteworthy challenge."' A decade
before, Zelinsky went further, arguing that tax expenditures might
actually be less prone to abuse than direct expenditures."1 5 He noted
that funneling a wide variety of fiscal choices through one narrow
gateway - i.e., the Congressional tax writing committees - would
facilitate improved oversight by the media and the public."'
"I See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 973. The authors concede that tax
expenditures "possess . . . traits that tend to make them open to inefficiency or abuse."
Id. at 978.
172 See Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 160, at 726-27 ("The whole approach to
tax incentives - one of rather careless or loose analysis, failure to recognize that
dollars are being spent, or to recognize the defects inherent in working within the
constraints of the positive tax system - has produced very poor programs."). Even if
these tax "apps" are not always inferior, some tax apps would fare poorly as direct
expenditures. Likewise, many popular smartphone apps would fail as stand-alone
products. There is no reason that the same song-identifying capacity that has made
Shazam and SoundHound so popular could not have been produced independent of
smartphone technology. Such a device might even be better suited to the task.
Nevertheless, the expense of producing it - and the bother of carrying it with us -
would make it immensely impractical.
17 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 981.
11 See id. at 974.
u7 See Zelinsky, Gucci Gulch, supra note 92, at 1194 (speculating that the
procedural advantage facilitated by the Supreme Court decisions preceding Winn may
pose little threat to the Establishment Clause).
"1 See id. ("Because of the more numerous and diverse interests to which they are
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More often, scholars have concluded that tax expenditures should
be presumed suspect.'7 Tax policy purists take an even stronger
position than Surrey himself.178 While Surrey argued that "many" tax
subsidies should be replaced with direct expenditures, 179 others see tax
subsidies as "almost always . . . inferior to analogous cash outlays."8 o
By introducing extraneous provisions into the tax law, they argue,
even a tax expenditure that withstands Weisbach and Nussim's
institutional choice scrutiny has a detrimental impact on compliance
and enforcement. 1
The thread that unites these disparate views of tax expenditures is a
shared conviction that tax expenditures can be - and are - abused.
Of course, these differing perspectives on tax expenditures do
ultimately part ways. The point at which they diverge most
dramatically is in their assessment of the urgency of the threat tax
expenditures pose.' As detailed in the next subpart, the fiscal
subject and their greater visibility to the public, the committees and agencies that
design and administer tax subsidies are less prone to capture by clientele groups,
conform more closely to pluralist norms, and are better positioned to make decisions
informed by expertise than their direct expenditure counterparts.").
17 That suspicion is a function of the "indefensible consequences that result when
Congress uses special deductions, exemptions and other tax mechanisms to achieve its
spending goals." McIntyre, supra note 6, at 79-80,
178 Those purists may be more a straw man than a reality. Zelinsky, for example,
invokes the "Surrey school's invariable preference for direct government outlays" but
does not provide specific evidence of that invariable preference. See Zelinsky, Gucci
Gulch, supra note 92, at 1165.
171 See Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 160, at 737.
180 Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating, supra note 5, at 441 (attributing that
vehemence to Surrey).
181 See Fleming & Peroni, Divorced, supra note 66, at 179 (concluding that tax
expenditure analysis provides "a much needed restraining effect on the strong impulse
by Congress to enact governmental programs in the form of tax incentives and
subsidies that would not pass muster under a cost/benefit analysis as direct spending
programs and that would have a detrimental effect on income tax compliance and
enforcement").
182 At the risk of overgeneralization, commenters can be divided into two camps.
The first insists that Congress must somehow be "restrain led]" and that the tax
expenditure budget is the mechanism to provide that restraint. See Fleming & Peroni,
Reinvigorating, supra note 5, at 561 (concluding that the tax expenditure budget is
"meant to have a salutary restraining effect on the strong impulse by many members
of Congress to engage in obfuscation by enacting governmental programs in the form
of tax incentives that they would never advocate as direct expenditure programs").
The second sees the tax expenditure budget primarily as an informational tool. See,
e.g., Roin, supra note 4, at 608 ("The tax expenditure budget was developed as ... an
informational aid.").
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advantage concept permits skeptics and true believers alike to
articulate their profoundly different views.
C. Prototypical and Marginal Fiscal Advantage Vehicles
The tax budget expenditure budget lacks the capacity to produce an
accurate assessment of the risk of tax expenditure abuse, instead
offering a crude cost estimate. In its original incarnation, no more
precision would have been needed. After all, a truly successful tax
expenditure budget would have been a blank page!
The two illustrations offered below demonstrate just how poorly
suited the (undead) tax expenditure budget is for its new life. Fiscal
advantage analysis delivers neither a bright-line test for tax
expenditure abuse nor a precise estimate of the costs of their misuse.
Unlike the tax expenditure budget, it does not labor under the
delusion that it can. The tax expenditure budget falsely ascribes no
risk to the use of tax treaties while reaching the dubious conclusion
that the mortgage interest deduction presents a high risk of abuse.
Neither assessment holds water.
1. Double Tax Treaties
It may be credulous to believe that our political process generally
produces laws that serve the public interest. 183 A prototypical
beneficiary of fiscal advantage provides even more reason for
skepticism.18 To paraphrase a tongue-in-cheek definition of a tax
shelter, an abusive tax expenditure is one created by smart people
that, stripped of the benefits fiscal advantage, would be politically
stupid."' Buoyed by an abundance of fiscal advantage, even the most
abusive tax expenditure may stand a disconcertingly good chance of
being enacted.
The political tailwind that fiscal advantage provides increases the
risk that, in Surrey's words, government actors will create tax rules
that they would not "defend in substantive terms were the programs
cast as direct expenditure programs."' 6 One particularly striking
183 See Roin, supra note 4, at 605 ("Some amount of rent-seeking is endemic to all
societies and all political systems, and perhaps to all human relationships.").
184 This was Surrey's core observation with respect to budgetary advantage. As
Weisbach and Nussim put it, budgetary advantage can "skew outcomes." Weisbach &
Nussim, supra note 61, at 977.
18 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
186 Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 160, at 727.
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example of that phenomenon is the double tax treaty. 1 7 In the years
since Surrey concluded that treaty-based tax preferences deserved to
be classified as tax expenditures,' the drive to strengthen the U.S. tax
treaty network has continued unabated." Had his view gained
traction - it unequivocally did not - it is possible to imagine a less
auspicious trajectory for double tax treaties.
Because of their exclusion from the tax expenditure budget, the
double tax treaty's fiscal advantage is great. Since treaty-based tax
preferences fall entirely outside the tax expenditure budget, viewed
from that traditional vantage point treaties appear wholly
innocuous.'90 Whereas the tax expenditure budget blithely ignores tax
treaties, as detailed in Part II and depicted in Figure 3, even Surrey's
conservative take on tax treaties reveals not only budgetary, but also
cognitive and procedural advantage.1 9'
2. The Mortgage Interest Deduction
The tax expenditure budget starkly understates the threat of abuse
posed by treaty-based tax preferences. It also overstates the risk of tax
expenditure abuse posed by others. The deduction for home mortgage
interest exemplifies that tendency. The tax expenditure budget's
treatment of the deduction for home mortgage interest presents the
mirror image of the occlusive dynamic described above, transforming
the deduction into a fiscal scapegoat.
18 Double tax treaties aid multinational business by alleviating the multiple national
taxes that might apply to cross-border income. See Dagan, supra note 130, at 981.
" See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
189 That relentless drive to expand treaty preferences has unfolded in the absence
of evidence that double taxation remains a threat. In fact, while the "original problem
of international taxation" was "double taxation ... nowadays the decisive issue is ...
the enforcement problem inherent in double non-taxation." THOMAS RIXEN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAx GOVERNANCE 200 (2008).
190 As Weisbach & Nussim put it, their exclusion from the tax expenditure budget
gives them the "patina of good tax policy." Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 976.
191 See supra Figure 3. In the years since McDaniel's call to heed the costs of tax
treaty preferences went unanswered, the consequences of that failure have become
evident. Policymakers of all stripes have long lamented the impact of the relatively
high U.S. corporate tax rate on U.S. competitiveness. More recently, the focus has
fallen on the disproportionate impact of those high nominal rates on primarily
domestic enterprises (e.g., Walmart) relative to global businesses (e.g., Google). Had
the fiscal advantage - budgetary, cognitive, and procedural - associated with treaty-
based preferences not gone unacknowledged, a lower corporate rate might have
trumped treaties. If the concerns described above have any merit, that would have
meant a more pro-competitive and equitable corporate tax.
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Although it is often seen as the embodiment of all the ills associated
with tax expenditures, when compared with treaties, the fiscal
advantage it enjoys seems surprisingly modest.m1 2 The tax expenditure
budget itself is partly to blame. Because the revenue loss linked to the
deduction has long been identified and quantified, the home mortgage
interest deduction provides a poor vehicle for budgetary advantage. 193
Viewed solely in terms of budgetary advantage, one could reasonably
ask whether the home mortgage interest deduction provides any fiscal
advantage. 9 It is certainly inappropriate to conclude that the dollar
figure the tax expenditure budget assigns to it provides an accurate
measure of the mischief it represents."9
Beyond budgetary advantage, the mortgage interest deduction seems
to derive relatively little benefit from the remaining two forms of fiscal
advantage. As a practical matter, cognitive advantage does not seem
particularly important. It is not as difficult, in other words, to imagine
a direct subsidy for homeowners as it would be to envision
Kornhauser's hypothetical checks-to-hedge-fund-managers program.
Because it draws such a spotlight on the measure, one could even
argue that the deduction's scapegoat status has eliminated any
conceivable cognitive advantage.
Finally - particularly when compared to tax treaty preferences -
the mortgage interest deduction provides scant opportunity for
procedural advantage. Because it resides in an ordinary statute rather
than a treaty, making the home mortgage interest deduction more
192 To an extent, it provides precisely the sort of regressive subsidy that troubled
Surrey. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs
of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1361 (2000) ("The
home mortgage interest deduction thus constitutes an upside-down subsidy - the
greater the need, the smaller the subsidy."). The precise distributional impact of the
mortgage interest deduction is, of course, complicated. See, e.g., Sugin, Distributive
Justice, supra note 143, at 22 (exploring distributional consequences of repealing the
mortgage interest deduction).
19 The prominence granted this particular tax expenditure by the tax expenditure
budget gives it a uniquely high profile. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 61, at 970
("In many cases, it is hard to believe that tax expenditures are less visible than other
government programs. For example, there is little reason to believe that the home
mortgage interest deduction is less visible than, say, the implicit guarantee the
government provides to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower mortgage costs.").
1" Although imperfections in the tax expenditure budgeting process inevitably
create opportunities for some fiscal sleight-of-hand, many years of experience both
with the deduction itself and in accounting means that such opportunities should be
limited.
19 It would be disingenuous, for example, to argue that the home mortgage
interest deduction represents ninety billion dollars worth of rent-seeking in 2010. See
ESTIMATES BY BUDGET FUNCTION, supra note 107, at 34-54.
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generous would require the approval of both the House and the
Senate. Moreover, its very popularity forecloses other opportunities for
procedural advantage. It would take a brave legislator indeed to
impose a sunset on the home mortgage interest deduction."'
D. Gauging the Risks of Tax Expenditure Abuse
Tax treaties present a more prototypical source of fiscal advantage
- and a greater risk of abuse - than the home mortgage interest
deduction. The tax expenditure budget concludes - and, not
coincidentally, conventional wisdom holds - just the opposite.
Rather than merely being impotent, that contrast suggests that the tax
expenditure budget does affirmative harm.19 7 As the tax expenditure
budget's earliest critic put it: "Halftruths are often more deceptive than
silence."" Twisting tax expenditure analysis into a commitment
device may have hurt the cause of limiting tax expenditure abuse more
than it helped.'
1. Lies and Halftruths
The line item represented by the home mortgage interest deduction,
for example, tells us less than nothing about the mischief it causes. As
described above, although the large dollar figure the tax expenditure
budget attributes to the deduction hints at an unusually high threat of
abuse, it actually ensures that just the opposite is true. At the other
end of the spectrum, the advantage permitted by the Winn tax
expenditure may have a cost that far exceeds the dollar amount listed
on Arizona's tax expenditure budget.200
"6 By sunsetting the mortgage interest deduction, legislators could understate its
long-term cost in the way they could not with a direct expenditure. In doing so, they
would also stand a good chance of abbreviating their political careers. See Mann, supra
note 192, at 1348 ("The home mortgage interest deduction is America's favorite
itemized deduction.").
197 Even the most zealous deficit hawks might, for example, ignore tax
expenditures merely because the tax expenditure budget omits them. That is true even
though they might prefer to impose higher taxes on cross-border transactions rather
than reducing or eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction.
198 See Bittker, supra note 14, at 259.
199 In other words, in weaponizing tax expenditure analysis, Surrey sacrificed a
significant amount of clarity. See Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures, supra note 1, at
189 ("Unfortunately, Surrey, in promoting his version of tax expenditure analysis,
undermined this clarifying function by also enlisting the analysis as a weapon in
battles over what the governments distribution should look like - in particular, his
support for progressivity and comprehensive income taxation.").
200 See supra text accompanying note 78.
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The tax expenditure budget's fixation on budgetary advantage and
on a checklist definition of a tax expenditure has proven
counterproductive. Ultimately, it is just as unsatisfying as defining a
"lie" as "the idea of saying something that is untrue."201' Adopting the
same narrow view of tax expenditure abuse cannot help but lead to
similarly unsatisfying results. Although budgetary advantage poses a
serious threat to fiscal accountability, procedural and cognitive
advantage can pose a greater danger. Embracing a prototype view of
tax expenditure abuse makes it possible to more accurately and
comprehensively describe the risks fiscal advantage presents.
2. Three Dimensions are Better than One
Burdened with the disadvantages of being both an accountant and
dead, the tax expenditure budget hardly seems the right tool for the
complex task of measuring tax expenditure abuse risks. In the same
vein, plunging a chain into a pool of water may reveal its depth, but
that information must be supplemented to accurately calculate the
volume it contains.2 02 The tax expenditure budget likewise only
provides a crude measure of the risk of tax expenditure abuse, taking
account of only one of three - or more - relevant dimensions of
fiscal advantage20
In a perfect world, flawed gimmicks like the tax expenditure budget
could be discarded. In our decidedly second-best world, it would be
rash to throw away any tool of budgetary accountability that might be
productively recycled. Fortunately, the fiscal advantage concept
bridges the gap between the rudimentary tool available and the
demanding task of measuring the abuse potential posed by a diverse
array of tax expenditures.
Put differently, the fiscal advantage concept offers the equivalent of
a simple formula that allows a chain to measure volume as well as
distance.2 04 The above discussion of tax treaties and the mortgage
interest deduction illustrates how that might be accomplished. The tax
201 See Coleman & Kay, Lie, supra note 95, at 28 (noting that "people frequently
say things that are not true but which nonetheless are not called lies - e.g., when the
speaker is sincerely trying to convey what he believes to be true information. Honest
mistakes and innocent misrepresentations occur frequently, and are not labeled lies.").
202 If that pool is cylindrical, the relevant formula would be volume = nr2h. That
formula makes it possible to determine the amount of water the cylinder contains
even if no volume measurement device is available.
203 This Article only describes three forms of fiscal advantage. Other takes on fiscal
advantage could slice it up along different lines or even into more slices.
204 See supra text accompanying note 202.
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expenditure budget provides a point of departure, presenting data that
can then be manipulated along with the additional information
revealed through fiscal advantage analysis to provide a comprehensive
picture of tax expenditure abuse risks.
The resulting assessments would be more ordinal than cardinal,
indicating for example whether a tax expenditure is a relatively
prototypical or marginal vehicle for tax expenditure abuse. Tax
treaties would be categorized as posing a high risk of abuse while the
mortgage interest deduction poses only a modest threat. Far less
precise than the measures offered by the tax expenditure budget ($90
billion worth of malfeasance for the mortgage interest deduction and
$0 for tax treaties), such an approach would nevertheless present a
much more accurate indication of where accountability gaps exist.
3. Assessing Reform Proposals
No less important, fiscal advantage provides a vocabulary for
comparing the relative advantages of potential alternatives to the tax
expenditure budget."' For example, scholars have proposed
eliminating the stand-alone tax expenditure budget along with all
budgetary distinctions between tax and direct expenditures.o 6 The
result would be a unitary budget that includes tax expenditures,
accounting for them no differently than cash outlays by the federal
government.
Such a change would further limit budgetary advantage by making
some shortcomings of the tax expenditure budget irrelevant.20 7 A
unitary approach would curb opportunities for procedural advantage.
For example, incorporating tax expenditures in the budget proper
would cause tax expenditure sunset provisions to be ignored just as
205 At the same time, reforms of the tax expenditure budget could make fiscal
advantage analysis more useful. For example, the renewed emphasis on the
distributional impact of tax expenditures that Linda Sugin has called for could help
observers identify instances in which cognitive advantage has produced particularly
unappealing results. See Sugin, Distributive Justice, supra note 143.
206 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking The Structures of Decisionmaking in the
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 387 (1998) (suggesting a revised
"functional" budget mechanism that would treat tax expenditures no different than
direct expenditures); Kleinbard, Hidden Hand, supra note 15, at 22 ("The most
important step would be to require that all tax expenditures be recorded as spending
for all budget purposes.").
20' For example, the ordinary budget takes behavioral responses into account while
the tax expenditure budget does not. Moving tax expenditures from what are
essentially the footnotes into the text of the budget would produce a more accurate
estimate of their budgetary cost. See supra note 115 and accompanying text,
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they are when imposed on direct expenditures.2 08 Likewise, injecting
tax expenditures directly into the budget could make them even more
difficult to ignore, making strides towards taming cognitive
advantage.2 09 That said, profound flaws would persist.21 o
The vocabulary of fiscal advantage does not offer a road map to
eliminating tax expenditure abuse. Instead, it presents a set of tools
that make it possible to clearly perceive and articulate the threat posed
by individual tax expenditures and to assess the promise of
alternatives to the tax expenditure budget. Here, fiscal advantage offers
a means of gauging the benefits of a unitary budget, suggesting that it
addresses some, but not all, of the shortcomings of the tax expenditure
budget.
CONCLUSION
Preoccupation with the tax expenditure budget has itself become a
bad habit. Breaking free of the false precision offered by the tax
expenditure budget is essential, but will by no means be easy.
Acknowledging that no tax expenditure budget can, on its own,
contain tax expenditure abuse represents an important first step. The
next, developing a more complete understanding of the unique
properties these fiscal superconductors possess and the abuses they
facilitate, demands a new vocabulary.
Embracing fiscal advantage analysis would go a long way towards
providing fiscal accountability. Budgetary, cognitive, and procedural
advantage permit a more nuanced approach to examining tax
expenditure abuse that will never produce the clear picture in dollars
and cents that the tax expenditure budget purports to provide. Fiscal
advantage analysis would, however, focus attention on the tax rules
that pose the gravest threats to accountability and restraint.
208 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 55, at 1009.
20 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
210 Tax treaties would remain budget phantoms. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
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